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RODERICK E. WALSTON*

The Public Trust Doctrine in the
Water Rights Context
INTRODUCTION

Under the public trust doctrine, the state holds its navigable waters
and underlying beds in trust for certain public uses, principally navigation,
commerce, and fisheries.' Recent court decisions have expanded the doctrine to include virtually any public use associated with navigable waters,
such as recreation and aesthetics. 2 Since the state holds public uses in
trust for the public, the state cannot wholly alienate such uses, and private
users cannot obtain vested rights in navigable waters that are paramount
to public uses.' Hence, if the state purports to grant a fee interest in
navigable waters, it can revoke the fee grant.4 Some courts regard the
public trust doctrine as a form of state property in that it creates a public
easement in navigable waters. 5 Others appear to regard the doctrine as
an exercise of sovereign state regulatory power, analogous to the police
power.6
The public trust doctrine is essentially a common law doctrine, in that
it is the creation of courts rather than legislatures. The doctrine has been
implanted, although not by name, in the constitutions and statutes of
many states. Some states provide by constitutions or statutes that water
is the "property" of the people. 7 Others provide that water use is a "public
use" subject to state regulation and control.' The former presupposes that
the state has a paramount proprietary right in water, and the latter that
the state has a paramount regulatory interest. Although these provisions
define the nature of state interests in different ways, they make clear that
the state has unique interests in navigable waters.
*Deputy Attorney General, State of California
1. See Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452-61 (1892); City of Berkeley v. Superior
Court, 26 Cal.3d 515, 521-23, 606 P.2d 362, 364-66, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 329-31 (1980); Marks
v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 258-62, 491 P.2d 374, 379-82, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 795-98 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Marks, at 259, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
3. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 445, 658 P.2d 709, 727, 189 Cal.
Rptr. 346, 364 (1983)
4. Illinois Central R.R., 146 U.S. at 453 (1892).
5. Marks, at 259, 491 P.2d at 379, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 795.
6. NationalAudubon Soc'y, at 437, 658 P.2d at 721, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 358.
7. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE 102 (West 1971); COLO. CONST., art. XVI, §5; IDAHO CODE
42-101 (1977).
8. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., art. X, § 5; Mont. Const., art. IX, § 3; WASH. CoNsr., art. XXI, § 1.
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The public trust doctrine originated in Roman law. The Institutes of
the Emperor Justinian provided that water, like air, is incapable of private
ownership; the resource belongs to everyone and therefore can be owned
by no one. 9 Under the English common law, the King was held to have
sovereign power in navigable waters, and his sovereign power was paramount to private proprietary interests. "'After the American Revolution,
the King's sovereign control of navigable waters was transferred to the
states. " When the Union was formed, the states surrendered to the federal
government the power to regulate commerce, but otherwise retained their
sovereign interests in navigable waters. 2 The states' sovereign interests
provide the foundation of the public trust doctrine, which recognizes that
the states have unique powers and responsibilities in the waters.
The public trust doctrine is analogous in many ways to the federal
navigation servitude, a federal constitutional doctrine that authorizes the
federal government to take private property rights for navigation purposes
without payment of compensation.' 3 The Supreme Court has held that
the federal navigation power authorizes Congress to legislate for the
protection of federal navigation interests, but does not bar obstructions
in navigable waters. 4 According to the Court, no federal common law
prohibits, or even applies to, obstructions in navigable waters.' 5 To fill
this void, Congress has enacted several laws, such as the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1899,"6 the Clean Water Act,' 7 and the Wild and Scenic
Rivers Act," providing for regulation and control of navigable waters.
The public trust doctrine, on the other hand, protects public interests in
navigable waters in the absence of implementing legislation. Thus, the
public trust doctrine, in itself, creates sovereign rights and obligations,
while the federal navigation power does not. Hence, although the two
doctrines are analogous in many ways, they fundamentally differ in terms
of their self-executing effect.
The public trust doctrine first gained national recognition in the United9
States Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois.
There, the Illinois legislature had granted a fee interest in the Chicago
(S. Scott trans. reprinted ed. 1973).
9. INsTITUTS OF JUSTINIAN 2. 1.1
10. Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. I, 11-18 (1894).
II. Shively, 152 U.S. at 24-31; Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (IHow.) 212, 224-29 (1845).
12. Shively, 152 U.S. at 25-31.
13. E.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); United States
v. Grand River Dam Auth.. 363 U.S. 229, 231-33 (1960).
14. Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. I (1888).
15. Id.
16. Ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§401-467e (1983)).
17. Pub.L.No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1972)).
18. Pub.L.No. 90-542, 82 Stat. 906 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1968)).
19. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
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waterfront to a railroad company. The legislature later revoked the fee
grant, and the railroad company sued. The Supreme Court upheld the
action of the Illinois legislature, declaring that Illinois held sovereign
interests in lands underlying navigable waters and that such interests were
held in trust for certain public uses. According to the Court, the legislature
could not alienate its trust responsibility over the lands, and if the legislature purported to alienate its responsibility, it could revoke the fee
grant. 20 The Supreme Court might have based its decision on the police
power, which allows the state to reasonably regulate private property for
public purposes." Instead, the Court held that the state has special interests and obligations in navigable waters, thus adopting the public trust
doctrine as part of American jurisprudence.
The public trust doctrine has traditionally been applied in land title
disputes involving the question of whether or not the state has paramount
rights as against private landowners in tidelands or other lands under
navigable waters. 2 State water rights laws have grown up without specific
reference to public trust principles, although as noted above, state constitutional and statutory provisions often recognize the state's proprietary
interests in water.23 State water rights laws generally consist of 1) the
riparian doctrine, which provides that private landowners have property
rights in waters contiguous to their lands,24 and 2) the prior appropriation
doctrine, which provides that water can be diverted to beneficial use.25
Prior to the California Supreme Court's decision in National Audubon
Society v. Superior Court,26 no court has ever held that the public trust
doctrine affects riparian or appropriative water rights.
In NationalAudubonSociety, the California Supreme Court considered
whether the public trust doctrine applied to and restrained the City of
Los Angeles' right to divert water from Mono Lake basin to its service
area. In the 1940s, the City had obtained appropriative water rights permits authorizing diversions from Mono Lake basin, and had built diversion facilities in reliance on the permits. The diversions provide the City
with approximately 17 percent of its water supply, but also cause environmental harm to Mono Lake by causing increased salinity which is
harmful to the brine shrimp population. The National Audubon Society
20. Id. at 455-60.
21. Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. 387; State v. Superior Court, 29 Cal.3d 210, 625
P.2d 239, 172 Cal. Rptr. 696 (1981); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.3d 515, 606 P.2d
362, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327 (1980).
23. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
24. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 P. 674 (1886).
25. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725, 742-49 (1950).
26. 33 Cal.3d 419, 658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983).
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brought an action to restrain the City's diversions, arguing that the diversions were invalid per se because they impaired public trust values in
Mono Lake. The City argued that the public trust doctrine did not apply
in the water rights context, and that the City had "vested" water rights
that could not be modified by subsequent state action.
The California Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, held that the
public trust doctrine applies in the water rights context, and that the City's
water rights were not "vested" but were subject to continuing state regulation and control.7 The Court, however, rejected National Audubon
Society's argument that the City's diversions were invalid per se because
they impaired trust values. Instead, the Court held that the public trust
doctrine, as applied in the water rights context, requires that the State
"balance" economic needs against environmental values in granting water
rights, and that the state retains continuing jurisdiction to determine whether
this balance is consistent with modern public needs.2" Indeed, the Court
stated that the state may authorize water diversions that impair public
trust values, if, in the state's judgment, the economic need for the diversions "outweighs" the environmental interest at stake.29 According to
the Court, four principles define the public trust doctrine as applied in
the water rights context:
(1) The state as sovereign "retains continuing supervisory control"
over navigable waters and underlying beds;
(2) The legislature, either directly or through the water rights agency,
has the right to grant usufructuary water rights even though such rights
will "not promote, and may unavoidably harm, the trust uses at the source
stream;"
(3) The state has the "affirmative duty" to take the public trust into
account in planning and allocating water resources; and
(4) The state has a "duty of continuing supervision" over water rights
even after such rights have been granted."
Other state courts have not yet followed the NationalAudubon Society
Court's lead in applying the public trust doctrine to determine the validity
of water rights granted under state water rights laws. Some state courts
have held that the public trust doctrine provides the doctrinal foundation
of the state's constitutional and statutory water rights scheme, and thus
that such schemes are a valid exercise of state legislative power." Other
27. Id. at 445-48, 658 P.2d at 726-29, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
28. Id. at 446, 658 P.2d at 727-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364.
29. id.
30. Id. at 445-48, 658 P.2d at 726-28, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65.
31. See, e.g., United Plainsman v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 462-63 (N.D. 1976).
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state courts have held that the public trust doctrine helps define the state's
obligations under such constitutional and statutory schemes, particularly
where such schemes impose "public interest" criteria.32 These courts have
not held that the public trust doctrine provides a basis for challenging a
water right granted under state law.
The NationalAudubon Society decision raises questions concerning the
precise relationship of public trust principles and conventional water rights
laws, and the California Supreme Court evidently chose to defer consideration of these questions until new cases arise. The main questions are
as follows:
1. Public Trust Criteria
Assuming that the public trust doctrine applies in the water rights
context, are the substantive criteria imposed under the public trust doctrine
the same as, or different than, the criteria applied under conventional
water rights laws? If the criteria are the same, the public trust doctrine
would apparently not have a substantial impact on existing water rights
laws. If, on the other hand, the criteria are different, the public trust
doctrine may potentially invalidate water rights granted and recognized
under existing constitutional or statutory laws, thus raising separation of
powers questions. The public trust doctrine works best in obligating state
agencies to consider public trust uses in granting water rights, and in
authorizing the agencies to reconsider past water rights decisions in light
of modem public needs. The doctrine works less effectively in imposing
substantive criteria relating to the acquisition or continuing validity of
water rights, where such criteria are already found in constitutional or
statutory authority.
2. Burden of Proof
Where the public trust doctrine is invoked to challenge an existing
water right, is the burden of proof borne by the party defending the
existing water right or by the party challenging it? The question may be
determinative of a particular controversy, especially where both the economic value of the water diversion and the environmental value of the
resource are significant. The question is an eminently difficult one, however, for the balance between such values involves judgments that are
conventionally within the legislative province rather than the judicial one.
On the one hand, deference should be given to long-standing water uses
32. Shokal v. Dunn, 109 Idaho 330, 707 P.2d 441 (1985); Montana Coalition for Stream Access
v. Hildreth, 211 Mont. 29, 684 P.2d 1088 (1984); Montana Coalition for Stream Access v. Curran,
210 Mont. 38, 682 P.2d 163 (1984).
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that serve important public needs, particularly where the water user has
relied on his fight by building expensive facilities. On the other hand,
public trust uses typically have a very high social value, especially where
a newly-appreciated environmental resource may be destroyed by continuing diversions. The proper solution would be for the legislature to
establish criteria that courts may apply in resolving public trust controversies.
3. Role of Courts and Agencies
Should courts encourage litigants to initiate public trust disputes before
state water rights agencies, or should the courts take the lead in resolving
such disputes? In NationalAudubon Society, the California Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff environmental group was not required to exhaust
its administrative remedies before the water fights agency, and that the
court could resolve the dispute without prior agency action." The Court
also suggested, however, that courts should generally refer complicated
water disputes to administrative agencies so that those agencies can apply
their expertise in determining the underlying facts of the controversy. 4
It would seem that litigants should be required to initiate public trust
actions before the state water rights agency, or at least that the courts
should refer such cases to the agency. These administrative agencies have
substantial expertise in resolving water allocation disputes and are generally supported by expert technical and legal staffs. Because the agencies
traditionally have responsibility for managing and allocating the state's
water supply, they often have a statewide perspective that courts may
lack.
4. Impact of Takings Clause
If the state modifies or revokes a water fight under the public trust
doctrine, is the state action subject to challenge under the Takings Clause
of the United States Constitution, which prohibits the states from "taking"
private property rights for public purposes without payment of compensation?"5 If state action can be challenged on these grounds, water users
may be able to claim federal constitutional protection even though their
fights are otherwise subject to regulation under state law.
Clearly a water fight is a form of "property," in that the holder of the
fight has a thing of value that may provide economic benefits to him. 36
33. 33 Cal.3d at 448-51, 658 PR2d at 729-32, 189 Cal. Rptr. at 368-69.
34. Id.
35. U.S. CONST., amend. V. The Takings Clause applies to the states under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
36. Palmer v. Railroad Comm'n, 167 Cal. 163, 138 P. 997 (1914).
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Therefore, a water right is a form of "property" protectible under the
Takings Clause. The United States Supreme Court, however, has held
37
that state law defines property rights under our constitutional system
Therefore, if a state defines a water right as a form of property subject
to continuing regulation and control, the right by definition is subject to
continuing regulation, and the property owner may not have a reasonable
expectation that his right is truly "vested." In that event, although the
water user may have "property" under the Takings Clause, the Clause
may not protect his right from continuing state regulation and control.
The United States Supreme Court has never expressly determined whether
the Takings Clause restrains state modifications of water fights under the
public trust doctrine or other theories. In Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,38
which involved state regulation of land use rather than water use, the
Court held that, although the state had the right to reasonably regulate
property use under the police power, unreasonable state regulation resulted
in an unconstitutional taking of property. Therefore, the distinction between a valid exercise of the state police power and an unconstitutional
taking of property is the reasonableness of the state action. It might be
argued that Pennsylvania Coal applies equally where the state regulates
water rights under its public trust authority. In Fox River Paper Co. v.
Railroad Comm'n,39 however, the Supreme Court held that Wisconsin
has the right to seize a dam owned and operated by a riparian water rights
holder, since Wisconsin has the right to define the nature of riparian rights
and thus has the right to subject such rights to state seizure. The Court
in Fox River, however, stated that Wisconsin did not have an absolute
right to define the riparian right in this way, declaring that the state
property definition must rest on a "fair and substantial basis" so that
there is "no evasion of the constitutional principles. "'
CONCLUSION
It is likely that the United States Supreme Court, when faced with the
question, will hold that the state has the right to define a water right as
subject to the continuing state regulation and control, and therefore that
water rights holders have no reasonable expectation that their rights will
be free of such regulation and control. Under this view, the Takings
Clause would not absolutely preclude state modifications of water rights.
This view is consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Fox River,
37. See, e.g., Hardin v. Jordan, 140 US.371 (1891); Oregon ex rel. State Land Board v. Corvallis
Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977).
38, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
39. 274 U.S. 651 (1927).
40. Id. at 656-657; see also Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36 (1944).
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holding that Wisconsin has the right to seize a dam owned and operated
by a riparian user. This view is also.supported by state constitutional and
statutory provisions declaring that the people have sovereign proprietary
rights in water,4 for these provisions suggest that water users take their
rights subject to the state's paramount right to regulate their rights as
necessary to serve important public interests.
It is less clear, however, if the Supreme Court will also hold that the
extent of state modification of the water rights is wholly beyond constitutional scrutiny. Instead, the Court may possibly hold that, although the
state can constitutionally modify or revoke water rights, the state cannot
exercise this power unreasonably, and therefore the courts are free to
determine the reasonableness of the state action. Under this view, the
courts presumably would consider the reasonableness of state water rights
regulation in the same way that, under PennsylvaniaCoal, the courts now
consider the reasonableness of state land use regulation. It is not clear,
however, whether limitations on state police power in the land context
can be readily transplanted in fixing any appropriate limits on state regulation of water rights, for the states have been traditionally regarded as
having uniquely sovereign interests in water. Indeed, the Supreme Court
has consistently held that, under the equal footing doctrine, the states
acquired "ownership of and dominion and sovereignty over" navigable
waters and underlying soils, subject only to rights constitutionally surrendered to the United States.42 Because of the states' uniquely sovereign
interests in water, the water rights holder would bear an especially heavy
burden in establishing that he has a reasonable expectation that the state
will not modify his right as necessary to accommodate important social
uses. Therefore, the state action would carry a strong presumption of
correctness, even assuming that the state action can be constitutionally
challenged. In short, the state may be able to constitutionally modify
water rights under public trust principles or other theories, although constitutional limitations might conceivably restrict the scope of state action;
even if such constitutional limitations apply, the water rights holder would
bear a heavy burden in establishing that state action has exceeded its
permissible constitutional scope.
41. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
42. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892); see Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan,
44 U.S. 212, 229 (1845); Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1841). In Martin, the Supreme
Court stated that: "[W]hen the revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves
sovereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters, and the soils
under them, for their own common use, subject only to the rights since surrendered to the general
government." 41 U.S. at 410. But see Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), and Baldwin v.
Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 384-86 (1978) which limits state ownership of fish
and game.

